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hen thinking about how different asset classes might 
take over benchmark status from Treasury securities, it 
is useful to look back at history. We have been here before. 
Twenty-five years ago, Treasury securities were the benchmark 
securities for the fixed-income markets at all maturities. Today, 
they are benchmarks only at the intermediate and long ends of 
the yield curve. In the late 1970s, the Eurodollar (LIBOR) cash 
market began to take over the benchmark status that Treasury 
bills had occupied. Starting in the mid-1980s, the Eurodollar 
futures market became the hedging and trading vehicle of 
choice for the entire short end of the market. While some of the 
factors that have led to the migration of the benchmark from 
Treasury bills to Eurodollars are not particularly relevant to the 
situation today, other lessons from that experience may be 
instructive for the issues we will face in the coming months.
One of the reasons—perhaps the reason why Treasury bills 
lost their benchmark status—is that they are not ideal hedging 
vehicles. Treasury bills are subject to very substantial supply 
shocks and the supply of bills is interest-inelastic. Thus, the 
Treasury market is a less efficient market than other fixed-
income markets in which both supply and demand respond to 
changes in interest rates. Inelastic supply is also a feature of the 
markets for intermediate- and long-term Treasury coupon 
securities.
In the Treasury bill sector, inelastic supply has been 
exacerbated by large shifts in supply—month to month, year to 
year, and over the course of the business cycle. For example, if 
tax receipts are extraordinarily high, the supply of bills may fall 
dramatically in the spring, effectively decoupling the Treasury 
bill from private sector interest rates. As a result of uncertainties 
in supply, the bill market’s benchmark status became 
vulnerable as soon as more liquid, private sector short-term 
securities became available.
A related issue, alluded to in Michael Fleming’s paper, is the 
fact that risk-free assets like Treasury securities can be poor 
hedging vehicles for other fixed-income securities because they 
do not have the same credit risk characteristics. At the end of 
the yield curve, LIBOR and Eurodollar futures are inherently 
superior hedging vehicles (relative to Treasury bills) for most 
private securities because they incorporate a sort of generic 
private sector risk premium.
As an aside, I would like to note that what we commonly call 
the credit risk spread—the difference between private fixed-
income yield and comparable Treasury yield—is actually only 
half of a credit risk premium. The other half is a supply effect 
reflecting the fact that supply in the Treasury market, 
particularly the supply of bills, is arbitrary and interest-
inelastic, and thus creates a distortion. A lot of things that we 
historically have called a credit risk spread are in fact just the 
result of shifts in the supply of Treasuries. 
While the market for Treasury coupon securities has some 
of the same attributes as the bill market, the coupon sector did 
not lose its benchmark status in the 1980s for two main 
reasons: market liquidity and the lack of deep alternative 
markets. First, the Treasury traditionally has worked to keep 
coupon sector supply as regular and predictable as possible. 
This (relatively) fixed supply schedule has been very important 
in developing liquidity in the Treasury market over the years. 
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While no private sector borrowers would commit to a fixed 
supply schedule because it is not optimal for them, a fixed 
supply has paid off for the Treasury in terms of vastly increased 
liquidity and an accompanying liquidity premium. In addition, 
the fact that Treasury coupon supply is inelastic may have 
increased trading volume and liquidity over the years, because 
it leaves a small market inefficiency for traders in Treasury 
securities to arbitrage away. Thus, the Treasury may benefit 
from forgoing the opportunity to exploit inefficiencies in its 
own market.
Looking ahead, it is not clear that supply even in the coupon 
sector can stay predictable. That is precisely the reason why 
people are asking whether coupons, like bills, are going to cease 
to be the benchmark.
The other reason why Treasury coupon securities did not 
lose their benchmark status in the 1980s is that there were no 
deep alternative private markets. That has changed. With the 
improvement of information technology and credit 
monitoring techniques, a much broader array of private sector 
borrowers now issue fixed-income securities with long 
maturities.
I will now turn to why LIBOR and Eurodollar futures 
replaced bills as short-term benchmarks fifteen or twenty years 
ago. From there, I will draw lessons from what might happen if 
coupon Treasuries now begin to lose their benchmark status.
What were the factors that gave Eurodollars the advantage 
over other private sector alternatives? The first factor was 
pricing transparency, particularly the fact that the Eurodollar 
market had a published reference rate (LIBOR) that was 
commonly accepted. The British Bankers Association LIBOR 
fixings were crucial to the acceptance of LIBOR as a pricing 
standard—and, ultimately, when a futures contract was 
offered, as a transaction and hedging vehicle.
The second factor was that the Eurodollar futures contract 
was designed as a cash-settled rather than a deliverable 
contract. Previous attempts to develop short-maturity private 
sector alternatives—commercial paper futures, domestic CD 
futures—died because of the messiness of deliverability. For 
Eurodollars, the futures market capitalized on the success of 
the published reference rate—LIBOR—to create a hugely 
liquid vehicle that traded just as a derivative.
What does that tell us about the options for alternative 
benchmarks going forward? One general lesson is that the 
better match between the credit risk of Eurodollars and that 
of other short-term securities gave Eurodollars a leg up in 
liquidity (relative to Treasury bills), particularly in times of 
market stress. Also, the Treasury bill market did not disappear 
when Eurodollars took over the benchmark status. It kept 
thriving as a store of liquidity and as a place to put money in 
tough times. It continued to be an extremely cheap source of 
funding for the Treasury. In other words, the Treasury does not 
have to worry about losing the benchmark status. Treasury 
securities will still have a role to play as a safe haven; they will 
still have very low rates even if they cease to be a primary 
trading vehicle.
Going forward, swaps may have an edge as benchmarks over 
agencies in part because it would be very easy to develop a 
widely recognized and accepted swap reference series. There is 
already an International Swaps and Derivatives Association 
swap series that could be improved and promoted and could 
become the basis of organized futures trading. This has not 
happened yet, and attempts to make it happen thus far have not 
been successful. However, if an improved hedging vehicle that 
does not decouple from private sector instruments in times 
of stress is needed, it would not be hard to create such a 
reference rate. 
Finally, I believe that the same lesson applies to agency 
securities. Agencies right now are a hot candidate to be 
benchmarks because their individual issue sizes come close 
enough to Treasury issue sizes to be liquid and tradable. 
However, history suggests that an agency futures contract 
based not on messy deliverability considerations but on an 
index of agency yields (with no balance-sheet implications for 
those who use it only as a hedging vehicle) is probably superior 
to a system in which individual cash agency securities are 
treated as the benchmark. The agencies would love to see this 
happen because such a system does not rely on large trading 
volume in the underlying security, but rather on the 
development of an index-based futures contract.
One of the major lessons learned from October 1998 
concerned the use of Treasuries as hedging vehicles for private 
sector securities that have different credit risk as well as 
different supply characteristics. If we accept the notion that a 
derivatives instrument based on an index of securities is a 
desirable benchmark for hedging, then the corporate bond 
market is also attractive. If the corporate bond market develops 
an index made up of large issue sizes—such as Ford’s global 
bonds—then you will have an ample supply of issuers trying to 
participate in that index. As a result, a futures contract on such 
an index could easily be traded, and might ultimately be the 
best hedging vehicle for those who underwrite corporate 
issuance. 
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